Jul 282013
 

I was asked to write the “Posts of the Week” for Techdirt this past weekend and used it as an opportunity to convey some of the ideas I explore here to that audience. The post was slightly constrained by the contours of the project — for instance, I could only punctuate my greater points with actual posts that appeared on Techdirt last week — but I think they held together with coherence, and I appreciated the chance to reframe some of the issues Techdirt was already exploring in this way.

In any case, I’ve decided to cross-post my summary here, partly because I always like to host a copy of my guest blog posts on one of my sites, and partly because it gives me a chance to update and annotate those ideas further. Please do go visit Techdirt though, which was kind enough to ask me to do this, to read more about the items described below.
Continue reading »

Jul 072013
 

There is so much to say about the emerging news about the data capture programs run by the NSA it’s hard to know where to begin. Part of the issue is that there are multiple programs and multiple statutes in play, and details about everything are continuing to emerge, which makes analyzing any respective legality complicated. Ostensibly some of these programs may in fact be “legal” under some of these statutes, although there are credible arguments that many of these programs transcend even what these laws might purport to authorize.

But even if these programs are consistent with either their enabling statutory language or previous Fourth Amendment case law, it is not at all clear that they are consistent with either the spirit or bare language of the Fourth Amendment:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Over time, on a case by case basis specific to the facts before them, courts have whittled away at what we might understand the Fourth Amendment to protect. Which is unfortunate, because on its face it would appear to protect quite a bit of personal privacy from government intrusion, except under very narrow circumstances. But as we learn more about these surveillance programs we see how, even if “legal,” they intrude upon that privacy, and in a way that essentially destroys all vestiges of it for everyone, criminal (or foreign) or not.

Which is what the rest of this post intends to focus on, albeit in a more humorous than purely analytical manner. But such flippancy shouldn’t discredit its overall point, and indeed, humor is often an excellent vehicle for illustrating policy shortcomings. In this case what follows highlights the problem with Section 215 of the Patriot Act, a post-9/11 law that allows government authorities to access, without a warrant and only with the questionable oversight of the itself apparently unaccountable Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, all sorts of “tangible things.” By accounts, it seems the NSA has used this provision to underpin at least one of its programs.

Because everything this court does is shrouded in secrecy, no one knows exactly what “tangible things” applies to. But we can make some reasonable suppositions, and the following articulates a few of them. Sung to the tune of The Sound of Music’sMy Favorite Things,” here is a modern update:

“My Tangible Things.” Continue reading »

Jun 162013
 

While originally I intended this blog to focus only on issues where cyberlaw collided with criminal law, I’ve come to realize that this sort of analysis is advanced by discussion of the underlying issues separately, even when they don’t implicate either criminal law or even technology. For example, discussions about how copyright infringement is being criminally prosecuted is aided by discussion on copyright policy generally. Similarly, discussions about shield laws for bloggers are advanced by discussions of shield laws generally, so I’ve decided to import one I wrote recently on my personal blog for readers of this one:

Both Ken @ Popehat and “Gideon” at his blog have posts on the position reporter Jana Winter finds herself in. To briefly summarize, the contents of the diary of the alleged Aurora, CO, shooter ended up in her possession, ostensibly given to her by a law enforcement officer with access to it and in violation of judicial orders forbidding its disclosure. She then reported on those contents. She is not in trouble for having done the reporting; the problem is, the investigation into who broke the law by providing the information to her in the first place has reached an apparent dead end, and thus the judge in the case wants to compel her, under penalty of contempt that might include jailing, to disclose the source who provided it, despite her having promised to protect the source’s identity.

In his post Gideon make a compelling case for the due process issues at stake here. What’s especially notable about this situation is that the investigation isn’t just an investigation into some general wrongdoing; it’s wrongdoing by police that threatens to compromise the accused’s right to a fair trial. However you might feel about him and the crimes for which he’s charged, the very fact that you might have such strong feelings is exactly why the court was motivated to impose a gag order preventing the disclosure of such sensitive information: to attempt to preserve an unbiased jury who could judge him fairly, a right he is entitled to by the Constitution, irrespective of his ultimate innocence or guilt, which the police have no business trying to undermine.

Ken goes even further, noting the incredible danger to everyone when police and journalists become too chummy, as perhaps happened in the case here. Police power is power, and left unchecked it can often become tyrannically abusive. Journalists are supposed to help be that check, and when they are not, when they become little but the PR arm for the police, we are all less safe from the inherent danger that police power poses.

But that is why, as Ken and Gideon wrestle with the values of the First Amendment versus the values of the Fifth and Sixth the answer MUST resolve in favor of the First. There is no way to split the baby such that we can vindicate the latter interests here while not inadvertently jeopardizing these and other important interests further in the future. Continue reading »

May 142013
 

This specific blog post has been prompted by news that the Department of Justice had subpoenaed the phone records of the Associated Press. Many are concerned about this news for many reasons, not the least of which being that this revelation suggests that, at minimum, the Department of Justice violated many of its own rules in how it did so (ie, it should have reported the existence of the subpoena within 45 days, maybe 90 on the outside, but here it seems to have delayed a year). The subpoena of the phone records of a news organization also threatens to chill newsgathering generally, for what sources would want to speak to a reporter if the government could be presumed to know that these communications had been taking place? For reasons discussed in the context of shield laws, reporters can’t do their information-gathering-and-sharing job if the people they get their information from are too frightened to share it. Even if one were to think that in some situations loose lips do indeed sink ships and it’s sometimes bad for people to share information, there’s no way the law can differentiate which situations are bad and which are good presumptively or prospectively. In order to for the good situations to happen – for journalists to help serve as a check on power — the law needs to give them a free hand to discover the information they need to do that.

But the above discussion is largely tangential to the point of this post. The biggest problem with the story of the subpoena is not *that* it happened but that, for all intents and purposes, it *could* happen, and not just because of how it affected the targeted journalists but because of how it would affect anyone subject to a similar subpoena for any reason. Subpoenas are not search warrants, where a neutral arbiter ensures that the government has a proper reason to access the information it seeks. Subpoenas are simply the form by which the government demands the information it wants, and as long as the government only has to face what amounts to a clerical hurdle to get these sorts of communications records there are simply not enough legal barriers to protect the privacy of the people who made them. Continue reading »

May 132013
 

One of the cases I came across when I was writing an article about Internet surveillance was Deal v. Spears, 980 F. 2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992), a case involving the interception of phone calls that was arguably prohibited by the Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511 et seq.). The Wiretap Act, for some context, is a 1968 statute that applied Fourth Amendment privacy values to telephones, and in a way that prohibited both the government and private parties from intercepting the contents of conversations taking place through the telephone network. That prohibition is fairly strong: while there are certain types of interceptions that are exempted from it, these exemptions have not necessarily been interpreted generously, and Deal v. Spears was one of those cases where the interception was found to have run afoul of the prohibition.

It’s an interesting case for several reasons, one being that it upheld the privacy rights of an apparent bad actor (of course, so does the Fourth Amendment generally). In this case the defendants owned a store that employed the plaintiff, whom the defendants strongly suspected – potentially correctly – was stealing from them. In order to catch the plaintiff in the act, the defendants availed themselves of the phone extension in their adjacent house to intercept the calls the plaintiff made on the store’s business line to further her crimes. Ostensibly such an interception could be exempted by the Wiretap Act: the business extension exemption generally allows for business proprietors to listen in to calls made in the ordinary course of business. (See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i)). But here the defendants didn’t just listen in to business calls; they recorded *all* calls that the plaintiff made, regardless of whether they related to the business or not, and, by virtue of being automatically recorded, without the telltale “click” one hears when an actual phone extension is picked up, thereby putting the callers on notice that someone is listening in. This silent, pervasive monitoring of the contents of all communications put the monitoring well-beyond the statutory exception that might otherwise have permitted a more limited interception.

[T]he [defendants] recorded twenty-two hours of calls, and […] listened to all of them without regard to their relation to his business interests. Granted, [plaintiff] might have mentioned the burglary at any time during the conversations, but we do not believe that the [defendants’] suspicions justified the extent of the intrusion.

For a similar view, see US v. Jones, 542 F. 2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976):

[T]here is a vast difference between overhearing someone on an extension and installing an electronic listening device to monitor all incoming and outgoing telephone calls.

And so the defendants, hapless victims though they seemed to have been in their own right, were found to have violated the Wiretap Act.

But Deal v. Spears is a telephone case, and telephone cases are fairly straight forward. The statutory language clearly reaches the contents of those communications made with that technology, and all that’s really been left for courts to decide is how broad to construe the few exemptions the statute articulates. What has been much harder is figuring out how to extend the Wiretap Act’s prohibitions against surveillance to those communications made via other technologies (ie, the Internet), or to aspects of those communications that seem to apply more to how they should be routed than their underlying message. However privacy interests are privacy interests, and no amount of legal hairsplitting alleviates the harm that can result when any identifiable aspect of someone’s communications can be surveilled. There is a lot that the Wiretap Act, both in terms of its statutory history and subsequent case law, can teach us about surveillance policy, and we would be foolish not to heed those lessons.

More on them later.

Mar 272013
 

I was interviewed yesterday about my concerns for the new Golden Gate Bridge toll system. Like an increasing number of other roadways, as of this morning the bridge will have gone to all-electronic tolling and done away with its human toll-takers, ostensibly as a cost-cutting move. But while it may save the Bridge District some money on salaries, at what cost does it do so to the public?

With the toll-takers bridge users could pay cash, anonymously, whenever they wanted to use the bridge. Fastrak, the previous electronic toll system, has also been an option for the past several years, offering a discount to bridge users who didn’t mind having their travel information collected, stored, and potentially accessed by others in exchange for some potential expediency. But now bridge users will either have to use Fastrak, or agree to have their license plates photographed (and thereby have their travel information collected, stored, and potentially accessed by others) and then compared to DMV records in order to then be invoiced for their travels.
Continue reading »

Mar 272013
 

I’ve written before about the balance privacy laws need to take with respect to the data aggregation made possible by the digital age. When it comes to data aggregated or accessed by the government, on that front law and policy should provide some firm checks to ensure that such aggregation or access does not violate people’s Fourth Amendment right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Such limitations don’t forever hobble legitimate investigations of wrongdoing; they simply require adequate probable cause before the digital records of people’s lives be exposed to police scrutiny. You do not need to have something to hide in order not to want that.

But all too often when we demand that government better protect privacy it’s not because we want the government to; on the contrary, we want it to force private parties to. Which isn’t to say that there is no room for concern when private parties aggregate personal data. Such aggregations can easily be abused, either by private parties or by the government itself (which tends to have all too easy access to it). But as this recent article in the New York Times suggests, a better way to construct the regulation might be to focus less on how private parties collect the data and more on the subsequent access to and use of the data once collected, since that is generally from where any possible harm could flow. The problem with privacy regulation that is too heavy-handed in how it allows technology to interact with data is that these regulations can choke further innovation, often undesirably. As a potential example, although mere speculation, this article suggests that Google discontinued its support for its popular Google Reader product due to the burdens of compliance with myriad privacy regulations. Assuming this suspicion is true — but even if it’s not — while perhaps some of this regulation vindicates important policy values, it is fair to question whether it does so in a sufficiently nuanced way so that it doesn’t provide a disincentive for innovators to develop and support new products and technologies. If such regulation is having that chilling effect, we may reasonably want to question whether these enforcement mechanisms have gone too far.

Meanwhile public outcry has largely been ignoring much more obvious and dangerous incursions into their privacy rights done by government actors, a notable example of which will be discussed in the following post.

Feb 202013
 

At an event on CFAA reform last night I heard Brewster Kahle say what to my ears sounded like, “Law that follows technology tends to be ok. Law that tries to lead it is not.”

His comment came after an earlier tweet I’d made:

I think we need a per se rule that any law governing technology that was enacted more than 10 years ago is inherently invalid.

In posting that tweet I was thinking about two horrible laws in particular, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). The former attempts to forbid “hacking,” and the second ostensibly tried to update 1968’s Wiretap Act to cover information technology. In both instances the laws as drafted generally incorporated the attitude that technology as understood then would be the technology the world would have forever hence, a prediction that has obviously been false. But we are nonetheless left with laws like these on the books, laws that hobble further innovation by how they’ve enshrined in our legal code what is right and wrong when it comes to our computer code, as we understood it in 1986, regardless of whether, if considered afresh and applied to today’s technology, we would still think so.

To my tweet a friend did challenge me, however, “What about Section 230? (47 U.S.C. § 230).” This is a law from 1996, and he has a point. Section 230 is a piece of legislation that largely immunizes Internet service providers for liability in content posted on their systems by their users – and let’s face it: the very operational essence of the Internet is all about people posting content on other people’s systems. However, unlike the CFAA and ECPA, Section 230 has enabled technology to flourish, mostly by purposefully getting the law itself out of the way of the technology.

The above are just a few examples of some laws that have either served technology well – or served to hamper it. There are certainly more, and some laws might ultimately do a bit of both. But the general point is sound: law that is too specific is often too stifling. Innovation needs to be able to happen however it needs to, without undue hindrance caused by legislators who could not even begin to imagine what that innovation might look like so many years before. After all, if they could imagine it then, it would not be so innovative now.

May 192012
 

There’s no discussing technology law without discussing how it implicates privacy.  But privacy is such a broad concept; to discuss it in any meaningful requires a definition with more detail.

I see there being (at least for purposes of the sort of discussion on this site) two main types privacy: privacy from the government, and privacy from other individuals.  And when it comes to regulating the intersection of privacy and technology, these two types of privacy require very different treatment. Continue reading »